Abstract -'Safe harbour' is shorthand for a bundle of privileges in insolvency which are typically afforded to financial institutions. They are remotely comparable to security interests as they provide a financial institution with a considerably better position as compared to other creditors should one of its counterparties fail or become insolvent. Safe harbours have been and continue to be introduced widely in financial markets. The common rationale for such safe harbours is that the protection they offer against the fallout of the counterparty's insolvency contributes to systemic stability, as the dreaded 'domino effect' of insolvencies is not triggered from the outset. However, safe harbours also come in for criticism, being accused of accelerating contagion in the financial market in times of crisis and making the market more risky. This paper submits that the more important argument for the existence of safe harbours is liquidity in the financial market. Safe harbour rules do away with a number of legal concepts, notably those attached to traditional security, and thereby allow for the exponentiation of liquidity. Normative decisions of the legislator sanction safe harbours as modern markets could not exist without these high levels of liquidity. To the extent that safe harbours accelerate contagion in terms of crisis, which in principle is a valid argument, specific regulation is well suited to correct this situation, whereas to repeal or significantly restrict the safe harbours would be counterproductive.
Introduction
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, the financial industry was proud that its standard contracts, the so-called 'master agreements', documenting derivative, repo and other types of financial transactions 1 worth trillions of US dollars in value, termination, close-out netting and collateral. 5 That is to say, what is discussed in this article refers to a cornerstone of our modern economies.
In the event of a financial institution's 6 insolvency or similar event, a master agreement limits the credit risk 7 of its financial counterparties. 8 Master agreements enable financial counterparties to liquidate entire portfolios of open contracts as soon as the other part fails or otherwise becomes a greater risk. 9 Prompt liquidation of all derivatives and repo positions leaves the counterparties with a relatively modest amount to pay to or, respectively, claim from the failing institution. Accordingly, their potential loss remains comparably small and their contracts do not run the risk of becoming entangled in lengthy insolvency proceedings that might be opened over the failing firm.
The laws of most developed financial markets 10 make sure that these -purely contractual -arrangements are enforceable despite the fact that the liquidation arrangements made under master agreements somehow contravene the pari passu principle, 11 much as in the case of security interests. The insolvency law provisions that guarantee the enforceability of master agreements in the event of insolvency are generally 5 See n 32 and n 35 and accompanying text. 6 'Financial institutions' is used here in the colloquial sense and includes banks, investment firms and many other types of business intervening in the financial markets. The exact scope of eligible financial institutions differs between jurisdictions, see P Paech, 'Close-out Netting, Insolvency Law and Conflict-of-laws' (2013) 14-2 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 419, 443-444. 7 Counterparty credit risk refers to the potential loss suffered by a party if its counterparty fails, in particular in case of insolvency. It basically corresponds to the replacement value of an unperformed contract (A fails and B, while neither has to perform, loses the value that their contract had for it). The risk only exists in relation to transactions that have a positive value for the solvent party. Counterparty credit risk is different from settlement risk (A fails before performing on the contract, while B has already performed). 8 'Financial counterparty' is often used to refer to an insolvent's counterparty which is a financial institution. 9 Typically, 'events of default' refer to events where one party fails to comply with its obligations, such as nonperformance, breach of contractual warranties or representations, etc. 'Termination events' refer to instances where no-one is at fault but the circumstances change, such as the merger of a party, taxation, etc. Both allow for immediate termination and liquidation of the contracts covered by the master agreement. 10 ISDA lists 43 jurisdictions in which the relevant provisions of master agreements are regarded as generally enforceable <http://www.isda.org/docproj/stat_of_net_leg.html#f1> accessed 10 March 2015. 11 For ease of reference, this article adopts a broad understanding of pari passu as the principle of equal treatment of general creditors which informs three questions, notably which assets are available for distribution, who participates in the distribution and how the assets should be shared amongst the general creditors (notably pro rata). However, these three issues differ conceptually, see, for example, M Bridge and J Braithwaite, 'Private Law and Financial Crisis', (2013) 13 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 361, 367-370. referred to in the context of US bankruptcy law as the 'safe harbour' rules. 12 In this article, I will use this catchy label also in relation to other jurisdictions, albeit with the caveat that safe harbours and their context differ from one jurisdiction to another, as will be shown below.
The rationale for the privileged treatment arising under insolvency safe harbours appears to be two-fold. The part of the rationale that occupies the less prominent place in the policy debate concerns increased market liquidity through an increased volume of repo and derivatives transactions. Quite comparably to 'traditional' security interests, 13 safe harbours encourage financial institutions to enter into these contracts by considerably reducing the degree of counterparty risk to which they are exposed. The second, more prominently voiced rationale refers to contagion in the market should one of these systemically important institutions fail. 14 This situation, where a financial market participant fails because of the earlier failure of its own counterparty is often described as 'a domino of insolvencies' or, more generally, systemic risk. 15 This second rationale is about decreasing overall systemic risk in the financial market.
However, the value of the special protection afforded by safe harbours may be questioned. 16 Particularly in the wake of the latest financial crisis, safe harbours may be 12 For an overview of the incremental development of US safe harbour rules see C Mooney, 'The Bankruptcy Code's Safe
Harbors for Settlement Payments and Securities Contracts: When is Safe too Safe?' (2014) 49 Texas International Law Journal 245, 247-251. 13 In the following I refer to 'traditional security interests', meaning arrangements such as, in particular, pledge, mortgage, hypothec and charge. This is to facilitate the distinction with the most popular form of securing an obligation in the financial market, so called title-transfer collateral, which is an agreement where the obligor transfers full (legal and beneficial) title over an asset which is to be re-transferred once the debt has been discharged. The difference between mortgage and title-transfer collateral consists in the fact that in case of a mortgage, the mortgagor retains equity of redemption of the asset whereas under a title-transfer collateral arrangement the obligor only has a contractual right to retransfer of title of an asset of the same type, see H Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-based Financing, para 3.14; M Smith, 'Security' in DD Prentice (ed), Corporate finance law in the UK and EU Oxford University Press 241, 242. 14 See UNIDROIT Principles on Close-out Netting (n 1), Principle 4 -Key Considerations. 15 For an explanation of systemic risk, see GG Kaufman and KE Scott, 'What is systemic risk, and do bank regulators retard or contribute to it?' (2003) VII-3 The Independent Review 371-391. 16 See insolvency regime may help to dismantle these distortions and decrease the risks inherent in the financial market.
Discussing these assumptions takes us straight back to the two prongs of the rationale of safe harbour rules. Again, as we know from the context of traditional security interests, it is debatable to what extent there is overall social and economic value in allowing parties to circumvent the pari passu baseline of distribution through private bargaining, leading to a shift of the risk away from those with higher bargaining power (typically banks) to the broader economy. It is ultimately the legislator who transforms the result of that debate into a normative policy decision as to the extent to which insolvency privileges are available.
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My main goal is to remove the biases that have dominated the debate so far.
Therefore, this article places the safe harbours into a broader context, notably by looking at jurisdictions other than the US and by adopting a cross-jurisdictional view, as opposed to an idiosyncratic one which is incongruent with the international character of financial markets. Furthermore, I believe that insolvency law cannot be considered in isolation but of what insolvency law can and should achieve, in particular in motivating market participants to adopt a certain type of conduct while they are still going concerns.
In the second section, I will widen the perspective to jurisdictions other than the US since the picture there is quite different. However, differences relate not so much to the safe harbour regime (which is fairly homogeneous globally speaking) as to the gap between the safe harbour, on the one hand, and the generally applicable insolvency regime, on the other hand: in the US, that gap is considerably more pronounced than it is in other jurisdictions (England, Germany, Italy and Belgium will serve as examples here).
As a result, the polarity between the treatment of the financial and the non-financial world -which generally informs the debate in the context of debtor-friendly US bankruptcy law -is the exception rather than the rule. It will become clear that jurisdictions with a 18 The differentiation between financial 'law' and financial 'regulation' is not very clear and in parts nonsensical.
However, for the present purpose one might think of 'law' as addressing horizontal rights between, in particular, creditors and debtors or owners and non-owners, whereas 'regulation' addresses the vertical State-to-market relationship, mainly working on the basis of orders, prohibitions and sanctions for non-compliance. 19 Since the recent financial crisis, the G20 States have set a number of broader policy goals aimed at strengthening financial regulation, in particular relating to derivatives clearing, bank capital requirements, banks' compensation practices, and bank resolution, see in particular 'G20 more creditor-friendly approach to insolvency policy are much more inclined to embrace the notion of insolvency safe harbours.
The third section addresses the less prominently discussed, yet probably more relevant rationale for safe harbours, that of increased liquidity. 22 Much like the rationale underlying traditional security interests, which are typically introduced to strengthen lending markets, 23 safe harbour rules allow for more liquidity in the relevant derivatives and repo markets. However, the economic advantages of safe harbours go far beyond the known effects of traditional security interests. They create remarkable flexibility across different types of asset relevant to the financial market, which are money, claims and securities. At the same time, they do away with certain legal categorisations, in particular that between title transfer collateral and traditional security. This gives financial institutions scope for a type of risk management where all positions may be used for all purposes and throughout all jurisdictions that admit safe harbours. Under the safe harbour protection, the use of collateral becomes extremely efficient-or, viewed from a different perspective, it would be fair to say that safe harbours allow the available collateral cover to be stretched ever more thinly.
The fourth section addresses the reduction of systemic risk as the more prominent rationale for providing safe harbours. While the base argument -that reducing individual counterparty risks leads to reduced overall systemic risk -looks relatively straightforward, there would appear to be two potential antagonists to the effect of safe harbours which render a discussion much more complex. The first antagonist is moral hazard. It stands to reason that considerably lower counterparty risk is likely to trigger a more lenient approach to matters of creditworthiness of counterparties -however, whether this will lead to a riskier market overall remains difficult to assess. It is equally unclear whether it should be the role of insolvency law at all to control market 22 'Liquidity' is the ability to sell any asset for other assets or cash at will, K Pistor, 'A Legal Theory of Finance ' (2013) thirdly, set-off of the positive and negative values so that only a net balance is owing;
and, fourthly, acceleration of the resulting payment obligation. 32 The safe harbour rules of the relevant forum typically prescribe that the close-out netting mechanism contained in the master agreement remains enforceable beyond the counterparty's insolvency and cannot be stayed or avoided on the basis of their being deemed inconsistent with the principle of equal treatment of creditors.
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In US law, by contrast, termination of executory contracts upon insolvency motivated solely by the financial position of the insolvent ('ipso-facto clause') is expressly prohibited and the set-off of any debt owing to the debtor is stayed from the moment the petition is filed. 34 Also, the trustee can cherry-pick, choosing contracts favourable to the insolvent estate and rejecting the others, thus disintegrating what was 31 See n 1. 32 The liquidation mechanisms provided for in the different master agreements do not necessarily work exactly in the same way but the functional result remains the same, see UNIDROIT Principles on Close-out Netting (n 1), Principle 2 with commentary. 33 Articles 4(4), 7(4) Financial Collateral Directive; 11 USC § § 362(b)(6)- (7)- (17)- (27) originally intended for liquidation en bloc. 35 As a result, the non-defaulting party must perform on contracts that are unfavourable from its point of view or else pay damages (largely corresponding to the replacement cost) for non-performance, yet will receive only part of the damages provided for those broken contracts that are favourable to it. It is worth emphasising that these principles apply not only in the context of reorganisation proceedings but also in the event of liquidation, evidence that the idea of saving a business is paramount in US bankruptcy law or, in other words, of its pronounced debtorfriendliness.
By contrast, other jurisdictions are less debtor-friendly and more creditor-friendly, regardless of whether they belong to the common law or the civil law tradition. Most prominently, England is much more creditor-friendly, and the general legal position in respect of liquidation of contracts upon insolvency was traditionally such that the later implementation of the EU Financial Collateral Directive did not require fundamental changes to the regime in place. In England, termination and set-off upon insolvency have always been possible, also in a non-financial context. 36 Under German law, the treatment of non-financial scenarios is much closer to the English position than to that of the US, with far-reaching termination and set-off rights also for non-financial counterparties. Belgium has introduced legislation that affords identical treatment in insolvency to financial and non-financial counterparties, which leaves only situations involving natural persons not acting in a merchant capacity to the general regime. The law expressly provides for close-out netting agreements to be enforceable. 38 Lastly, the Italian legal regime generally allows for close-out netting provisions for financial and non-financial market participants, although it makes an exception for large corporations.
B. Swift Access to Collateral
The second element of safe harbours relates to the timely enforceability of collateral in insolvency, ie, to the question of whether a secured counterparty may have immediate recourse to the collateral assets. In respect of financial counterparties, the various laws typically provide that, upon insolvency, financial counterparties can immediately enforce collateral provided by the insolvent, without prior authorisation, the obligation to conduct a public auction or similar requirements.
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In the US, again, this contrasts with the general approach taken in respect of nonfinancial counterparties. Outside the safe harbours, enforcement of security or collateral requires prior application to the court called upon to grant relief in case of otherwise inadequate protection of the secured creditor or if the asset is not essential to effective reorganisation. 41 then. If obligations are in different currencies or units, conversion is possible to make them congeneric). The continued availability of set-off combines with the validity of pre-commencement termination: termination values can be set off even if proceedings have commenced in the meantime. 38 Article 14 Loi relative aux sûretés financières. 39 Within special reorganisation proceedings for large companies, the right to terminate and set-off is not recognized.
However, the insolvency officials of the relevant proceeding would probably not be allowed to cherry-pick outstanding transactions under the master agreement that are favourable to the defaulting party and reject those that are disadvantageous for the latter. Instead, the insolvency official's choice to continue the master agreement applies to the entire bundle of covered transactions. 40 11 USC § 362(b)(6)- (7)- (17)- (27) This clearly contrasts with English law, where the general policy is very different from that in the US. In winding-up proceedings, creditors are largely unaffected by the liquidation process as they can remove their security from the pool and realize it. 42 In administration (remotely comparable to US reorganisation), the approach is obviously different and closer to the US model, as the secured creditor is dependent on leave from the court to enforce its security; this will usually be granted if significant loss to the secured creditor is likely to result from a refusal. 43 Only substantially greater losses caused to others by such leave may outweigh the interest of the secured creditor. 44 This is where the implementation of the Financial Collateral Directive has a significant impact, as it explicitly abolishes the requirement of court approval for transactions that come within its scope.
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Under German law, the general position 46 is that pledged movables are generally realized by the insolvency official for a secured creditor entitled to direct the manner in which the asset is realized and to whom immediate payment is made from the proceeds.
The asset can also be transferred to the creditor if that is the most suitable solution. The insolvency official does, however, have the right to use the asset for the estate, in which case compensation has to be paid to the secured creditor for any deterioration of the asset affecting the security. In this respect, the German regime is comparable to the US model. provides -for all market participants except natural persons -that the enforcement rights of those creditors benefiting from collateral are not suspended as long as the agreement creating the collateral was executed before the date of the bankruptcy order. The beneficiary of a share pledge has the right to appropriate the shares upon default of the pledgor. No prior notice or authorisation is required if appropriation is expressly permitted in the pledge agreement. 48 In Italy, the impact of safe harbour legislation on the swift enforcement of collateral is considerable, as the insolvency regime outside the safe harbours resembles rather the US then the UK approach. Court authorisation confirming the existence of the claim is needed to enforce collateral, and the court can
give directions as to how the security asset has to be realised and order it to remain part of the estate, against reimbursement of the creditor. 49 By contrast, in respect of financial collateral, the collateral taker is entitled to immediately enforce the financial collateral by sale or appropriation, with respect to financial instruments, or by set-off, with respect to cash.
C. Protection against Avoidance
The third element relates to avoidance. The relevant laws typically provide that in the insolvency of a financial institution, the insolvency official is generally unable to avoid prior legal acts on the ground that they constituted preferential treatment of a creditor or were undervalue transactions. 51 Again, the gap between general insolvency law and the privileged safe harbour regime may vary depending on the jurisdiction. However, as to avoidance, the picture differs from the findings of the foregoing sections. Here, the privilege afforded to financial institutions is of similar significance throughout, as robust 48 Article 8 Loi relative aux sûretés financières. Although no prior court approval is required, the law provides for the possibility for the courts to exercise some form of control afterwards, see 
Exponentiated Liquidity
The strong polarity of the insolvency treatment of the financial sector, on the one hand, and of the non-financial sector, on the other hand, such as currently exists under US law, seems to be the exception rather than the rule. In other jurisdictions, the gap between the safe harbour regime and the general insolvency rules is much smaller and in some cases, the treatment of financial and non-financial scenarios is even identical or quasi-identical, at least as regards termination, set-off and swift access to collateral. The only exception is the regime for avoidance. Here, safe harbour rules afford considerable relief to the financial industry, not only in the US but also in other jurisdictions. The more obvious consequence of the above finding is that the perception of egregious privileges afforded to financial institutions can only be upheld in a domestic tunnel vision. 58 Moreover, and more importantly, the above findings tie in seamlessly with the distorted view on the rationale for safe harbours. Liquidity as a main argument is not appropriate in a rather debtor-friendly environment such as the US Bankruptcy Code, which is why greater prominence is given, at least on the surface, to the systemic risk argument. In more creditor-friendly jurisdictions, which put greater emphasis on assets flowing back into the 57 Art 64-67 Bankrupty Act (Italy). economy quickly, there is obviously more room for a rationale based on liquidity and market efficiency.
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Unlike the case of traditional security interests, the liquidity rationale of safe harbours has never received the degree of prominence in the policy debate it would have deserved. 60 This is surprising, also because it may be safely assumed, in the light of lessons learned from the latest financial crisis, that in lobbying for safe harbours, the financial industry was probably focused more on business development than on risk limitation.
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On the face of it, safe harbours produce economic effects quite similar to those associated with the protection of traditional security interests in insolvency. 62 Because parties need not worry about their counterparty's solvency, derivatives and repo contracts become more easily available, and at a reduced cost. As a result, the basic economic effect of safe harbours is considerable growth in volumes of the relevant types of transaction, as could be observed in the run-up to the financial crisis, when repo markets doubled within 5 years 63 , and more efficient allocation of assets.
In considering whether to introduce insolvency privileges, legislators must take into account the fact that such privileges almost automatically entail a shift of the risk from one segment of the market to another, the latter being potentially 'weaker' creditors. In this regard, too, there are no fundamental differences between traditional security interests and safe harbours. Therefore, the basic assumptions about liquidity and the resulting discussion about the overall social value of insolvency privileges are very See also ISDA, Memorandum (n 59) where the word 'risk' appears eight times, whereas 'liquidity' is not mentioned at all; ABI, Reform of Chapter 11, (n 14) Section IV.E on 'Financial contracts, derivatives and safe harbour protection' mentions liquidity as a policy argument only once, and in the context of a side issue, whereas 'stability' is referred to eleven times. similar to those prevailing in the case of traditional security interests 64 and will not be addressed here. Rather, I will concentrate on four novel effects of safe harbour rules that represent a quantum step in terms of increasing liquidity, in particular if taken in combination with one another.
A. Flexibility across Legal Categories and Asset Types
The risk mitigation techniques of master agreements (as protected by the safe harbour rules) are used to abolish established legal boundaries. In particular, differences between full title and security interest disappear, and boundaries between claims, cash and securities become blurred. This high degree of flexibility is nothing less than revolutionary, overthrowing traditional legal restrictions on the use of assets with a view to obtaining cash and creating liquidity more generally. The EU Financial Collateral
Directive contains a paradigmatic blueprint for this phenomenon.
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First, the differences between full title and security interests disappear because the safe harbours sanction the use of title transfer collateral, netting and 'margining'. 66 Under such arrangements, while the collateral provider is protected as efficiently as it would be under a traditional security interest such as a pledge or mortgage, the collateral taker enjoys far greater freedom to use the collateral assets than it would under a traditional security interest, in that it becomes the legal and beneficial owner of the asset and can therefore dispose of it, without being obliged to return that specific asset as long as the asset returned is of the same kind. What is remarkable here is that the rights of one party appear to grow whereas the risk borne by the other party remains unchanged. Furthermore, the boundaries between claims, money and securities become blurred as the collateral provider can validly substitute new collateral assets for the assets originally provided, which it might need for other purposes. 67 The only proviso is that the replacement assets must be of substantially equivalent value. As a consequence, the collateral provider is allowed to replace one kind of securities collateral for another, or
give cash for securities collateral, or claims for cash collateral, etc.
On that basis, the specificity of the collateral assets becomes as irrelevant as their nature (money, claims or securities). Positions become interchangeable and the collateral provider will collateralize all available assets as efficiently as possible, thereby creating maximum return. The fact that assets are freed from the conceptual burdens associated with legal limits to traditional security interests means that they can be treated as mere accounting positions, the only parameter being current market value. Thus, thanks to the existence of safe harbours, a portfolio resembles a gigantic current account into which assets and liabilities, including collateral of whatever description, accruing under whichever type of arrangement, can be booked at current market value, so as to show the net exposure as a grand total.
B. Stretching the Collateral Cover Thinly
A phenomenon closely connected to the foregoing is the fact that safe harbour rules enable collateral to be allocated so efficiently that there will hardly be any collateral buffers around. The first aspect here is the effect of the enforceability of close-out netting on collateral levels. If a risk reduction of 80% can be taken for granted, 68 parties would, 67 'Substitution' describes the right to withdraw financial collateral on providing, financial collateral of substantially the same value, see, eg, Article 8(3)(b) Financial Collateral Directive. 68 The notional amount (face value) of all types of OTC contract stood at approximately USD 693 trillion at the end of June 2013. The gross market value of these contracts, ie, the cost of replacing all of them by equivalent contracts at the market price, was approximately USD 20 trillion. This amount corresponds to the gross market risk inherent in these contracts, ie, market participants were, on an aggregate basis, exposed to each other by that sum. At the same time, market participants' aggregate actual credit exposures, ie, the remaining credit risk taking into account legally enforceable master agreements amounted to of course, only collateralize the remaining 20%. Hence, much less collateral will be needed from the outset or, to put it differently, the same amount of collateral will suffice to cover a higher volume of transactions.
At the same time, master agreements make it possible constantly to adjust collateral levels to the underlying exposures so as to avoid over or under-collateralisation. These margining mechanisms rely on the safe-harbour limitation of avoidance powers as they might otherwise be classified as late provision of collateral.
Lastly, safe harbours enable the re-use of collateral assets by the collateral taker,
given that the latter generally becomes their legal and beneficial owner. Therefore, as opposed to what is common in other markets (which are bound to traditional secured transactions, lack of safe harbour protection), the collateral taker will generally put the collateral assets to use instead of just 'holding' them, thereby maintaining the assets in constant flow.
The result of the foregoing is that asset allocation is extremely efficient throughout the market. However, by the same token, it may also mean that the cover becomes extremely thin, as there are no longer any pools of unused assets.
C. Sourcing Collateral Globally
Collateral assets are scarce and sourcing them from a wider market would therefore be beneficial in terms of liquidity. However, before the broad introduction of safe harbour rules, financial institutions had to rely on domestic secured financing law. The diversity of mandatory insolvency and property law nurtured substantial doubts as to the crossjurisdictional enforceability of closeout netting and collateral. 69 Cross-border collateral borders. 73 Harmonisation on the basis of the introduction safe harbours not only lessens the importance of domestic policy in matters of insolvency but also reduces the importance of legal considerations in risk management to a significant extent.
D. Efficient Use of Regulatory Capital
Lastly, banking regulation sanctions the liquidity thus increased by the safe harbours.
Notably, it recognizes the net exposures used by financial institutions for risk management purposes also with a view to calculating capital requirements. Safe harbour rules are of fundamental importance in this context because the relevant regulatory rules require absolute certainty that close-out netting and collateral will be enforceable in the event of insolvency. 74 If that is so, banks are allowed to calculate their regulatory capital on the basis of net, rather than gross, credit risk exposures. As mentioned earlier, the average risk reduction through netting is roughly 80%. In order to grasp the effect of this significant reduction, it may be helpful to recall that regulatory capital is not, as is often assumed, a requirement to hold certain cash reserves available. Rather, regulatory capital describes the ratio between risk exposure and the capital raised by issuing own shares. As a consequence of the recognition of net risk in a safe harbour environment, a bank is able to enter six times the gross risk in its balance sheet than it would otherwise be allowed to accept. 75 By way of a simplified example: a bank's derivative and repo portfolio is taken into account at a gross risk of 1000 GBP because there are no safe harbours. This risk needs to be matched, at the current minimum rate of 10.5% regulatory capital, by
The effect is two-fold. 76 
A Systemic Risk Zero-Sum Game?
As we have just seen, safe harbours considerably increase efficiency and liquidity but may lead to the collateral cover being stretched thinly. The connection with the secondmore prominent -rationale for safe harbours is obvious: the question of how much collateral is available is of immediate importance for systemic stability: more efficiency increases the availability of collateral which is generally beneficial-but overstretching is harmful because there will be no reserves when collateral becomes scarce.
Insolvency safe harbours have to date mainly been regarded as necessary to decrease the systemic risk inherent in the financial market, in particular to assist in avoiding the domino effect of bank insolvencies. 77 To this end, derivatives and repo transactions need specific exemptions from the usual 'threats' that flow from the opening of insolvency 105 GBP in own share capital. In other words, the amount of issued share capital limits the possibility to take on more risk.
However, if netting is allowed the bank can, on the basis of the same 105 GBP in share capital, enter into contracts exposing it to a gross risk of 5000 GBP if we assume that close-out netting reduces the gross risk by 80%. 76 See Paech, 'The Need for an International Instrument' (n 1) 16-19. 77 See, in particular, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Report and Recommendations of the Cross-Border Bank proceedings. 78 First, the insolvency of one financial institution could provoke the failure of its counterparties which, alone or jointly, might in their turn bring down others, sparking off a chain reaction. Secondly, there is significant potential for transmission of liquidity problems between market participants. Thus, the limitation (or near-elimination) of individual counterparty credit risk is expected to have a beneficial effect on systemic stability. In other words, privileges afforded to counterparties of a failing institution would translate into systemic stability and therefore into advantages benefiting the market as a whole. This argument is particularly relevant to the financial sector, even more so than to other sectors, as financial institutions are so closely intertwined. 79 Network externalities are therefore much more likely to occur than they are in other industries, and furthermore spread from the financial sector to invade entire economies. 80 On the basis of this broad argument, safe harbour rules have been successively introduced in over 40
jurisdictions.
However, in light of the significant economic benefits that come with safe harbours, some authors regard them as the result of path-dependent legislation originally set off by banks' own lobbying efforts. 81 These, they argue, should now be considerably restricted or repealed altogether, since they actually created systemic risk rather than curbed it.
82
The reasons brought forward in relation to this argument are appealing, and the picture is certainly a complex one. Thus, while, on the one hand, credit risk contagion is effectively inhibited by close-out netting and collateral as protected by safe harbour rules, it is also true that, on the other hand, these mechanisms can at the same time develop adverse systemic effects through other transmission mechanisms. 83 Broadly speaking, relevant 78 See UNIDROIT Principles on Close-out Netting (n 1) Principles 6 and 7. examples fall into two categories of risk transmission mechanism, to wit, moral hazard and collateral/liquidity shortages.
While these two typical systemic risk transmitters can, in principle, antagonize the systemically beneficial effects of safe harbours, it would not make sense to analyse this interdependency in isolation. Regulation is much more relevant to the limitation of systemic risk and directly addresses the relevant contagion mechanisms through otheroften novel -measures. This leads to the question of whether the strong influence insolvency law has on conduct makes it an appropriate means to control systemic risk and the behaviour of market participants while they are going concerns. In the following sections, I shall attempt to combine these aspects to form an overall picture.
A. Moral Hazard
Safe harbours create a transaction environment for financial institutions that is almost entirely free of counterparty risk. This places financial institutions in a privileged position as compared to other, non-financial counterparties (although, as discussed in the second part of this article, the degree of privilege differs from one jurisdiction to another 84 ).
Thanks to these privileges, risk is shifted to non-financial counterparties, which alone have to bear the specific cost of bankruptcy. In that respect, safe harbour rules have an effect quite comparable to that of traditional security interests.
The existence of such a privilege is bound to affect the perception and conduct of market participants generally. As a result, the existence of safe harbours may provoke moral hazard. 85 In the context of financial regulation, the term 'moral hazard' describes a mechanism whereby real or presumed guarantees for the financial sector render the financial market more risk-prone on an aggregate basis. The phenomenon has been institutions had enjoyed high income generated by excessive risk-taking in the expectation that the cost of failure would be socialized. After the crisis, a number of regulatory changes were introduced in an attempt to tame moral hazard, with a view to reallocating to financial institutions and their stakeholders the risk they themselves create.
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Shifting the risk as such does not necessarily entail moral hazard. All kinds of insolvency privileges shift risk around the insolvent's various types of creditors. The question, rather, is whether that shift entails a behavioural pattern that increases the risk overall, or, to put it differently, whether the level of systemic risk in the market as a whole increases.
Such an overall rise in systemic risk could be caused in particular by market inefficiencies. Already in relation to traditional security interests, the possibility for bigger players to demand security indirectly subsidizes their businesses at the expense of certain other players, since the latter are unable to adjust to the increased risk. 87 The effect of the risk transfer caused by insolvency safe harbours is similar: parties to whom risk is shifted are generally remote from the financial sector and as a result lack the ability to monitor the shift and adjust their own behaviour, in particular by demanding a higher risk premium or by not entering into the relevant position or quitting it altogether. 88 The risktaming effect of corrective behaviour at that end of the market is lacking, and this in turn renders the distribution of risk inefficient and the market overall riskier. It is worth noting that this shift of risk is global, as in practice all eligible creditors will take the necessary steps to move ahead of the pool by using the safe harbours. the insolvent. It is true that non-adjusting market participants in the proper sense are few, traditionally they included retail depositors (which are now often protected by own preferences and/or deposit insurance) and ordinary creditors. However, mindful of the too-big-to-fail phenomenon, to which safe harbours contribute by allowing for exponential growth of the derivatives and repo markets, the State has traditionally assumed the risk as a whole, so that even adjusting creditors have no need to take the shift of risk into account.
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Furthermore, security may distort managerial diligence in the choice of counterparties. 91 As before, this argument can be translated into the context of insolvency safe harbours: financial counterparties rely exclusively on the risk-mitigation tools guaranteed under the safe-harbour regimes instead of investing into ex ante and on-going monitoring of their counterparties. 92 Yet, such overreliance on safe harbours could also lead to moral hazard. 93 By contrast, if, in the absence of safe harbours, monitoring were a necessity, any concentration of risk on certain players would be detected and priced in by potential counterparties; as a consequence, there would be more players with smaller risk portions in the market, and the market would be more diversified overall. 94 Moreover, in times of crisis, with falling or unclear collateral value, the information obtained through monitoring would allow lending to continue as healthy counterparties could continue to operate even in adverse times. 95 However, it is moot whether a case of moral hazard can be built on the foregoing. It is not evident that the market becomes riskier overall, as compared to the hypothetical 90 See Roe, 'Derivatives Market Payment Priorities' (n 16) 558-559; Peck, Mokal and Janger, 'Financial Engineering' (n 16), 12. It is debatable whether this holds true in all respects. The implicit State guarantee for banks might be regarded as the price paid for having energetic, growth-producing and stimulating financial markets. Although recent regulatory initiatives attempt to remove the State guarantee completely, it is not absolutely certain whether financial markets that go beyond pure utility banking can be governed in a way that makes bail-outs completely unnecessary in the future. See also more generally Pistor, 'A Legal Theory of Finance' (n 22) 323. 91 See Finch, Security, Insolvency and Risk, 646. 92 Roe, 'Derivatives Market Payment Priorities'(n 16) 560-561. 93 Roe, ibid. 94 Roe, ibid. 95 Roe, ibid 567-568.
alternative, a market without safe harbours. Hard evidence of such a connexion is difficult to establish and is often attempted with an eye to a preconceived result. 96 To begin with, obviously, improved monitoring is always beneficial. 97 Yet the value of monitoring highly complex, international and interconnected counterparties is limited.
Comprehensive data regarding the counterparties is unlikely to be available. Even where such data is available, its value is limited as counterparties' balance sheets are not static and are subject to network externalities, since the riskiness of assets depends on the market as a whole. 98 Therefore, the available data says little about the riskiness of a balance sheet in times of stress. In other words, monitoring counterparties to prevent risk is generally useful but not as powerful a tool as reducing counterparty risk through security, collateral and close-out netting -for which the existence of safe harbours is essential.
Speaking more generally, moral hazard, together with the too-big-to-fail argument, risk taking. 99 These measures address moral hazard and too-big-to-fail directly, instead of using the threat of unenforceability, the consequences of which are difficult to contain, as a vehicle. They are currently being refined and implemented on a wide scale, but of course this does not per se exclude complementary adjustments to the safe harbour regime should they prove necessary.
B. Collateral/Liquidity Shortages
When a financial institution enters troubled waters, the safe harbour-protected liquidation rights of counterparties will be triggered at some point. The contractual arrangements with basically all counterparties are highly likely to be affected simultaneously. 100 Such a scenario of mass liquidation can have adverse systemic effects that antagonize the beneficial systemic effects of safe harbours. 101 The following two examples illustrate how safe harbour rules can limit and spread contagion at the same time -'which effect is more important is conceptually indeterminate', thereby weakening the systemic risk rationale for insolvency safe harbours. consequence of the introduction of resolution regimes, counterparties of an ailing financial institution will fall into one of the following three categories. First, they will include those market participants that are not covered by safe harbour rules; these will generally belong to the non-financial world and will not be of systemic importance to the financial sector. Secondly, they will encompass those financial market participants generally covered to the extent that they deal with banks, investment firms and financial market infrastructures, which will in practice never become insolvent but enter resolution proceedings as they fail. Thirdly, they will include those financial market participants that are generally covered to the extent that they contract with a counterparty that enters insolvency proceedings as it fails, which means any financial institution other than banks, investment firms and financial market infrastructures or one of the aforementioned where the regulator decides not to invoke resolution but to allow the market participant to fail as it is of no systemic importance.
As a result, the safe harbour rules will remain without effect in the most systemically relevant failures, notably those of systemically relevant banks, investment firms and infrastructures. Instead, regulators will use a completely different set of legal mechanisms to avoid contagion, including a stay on termination of contracts. Where insolvency proceedings may still occur, notably upon failure of a systemically irrelevant financial institution, the systemic risk rationale of safe harbours does not bite: the failure of such an institution is unlikely to contribute significantly to systemic risk, either through knock-on effects on counterparties or by leading to a liquidity crunch. 125 Thus, it is probably fair to state that the introduction of bank resolution regimes has considerably reduced the scope of application of safe harbours mainly to systemically irrelevant scenarios. This does not, however, remove the importance of safe harbours for all types of financial institution which occur before resolution or insolvency proceedings are opened, as described earlier.
Conclusion
Insolvency safe harbours are conceived on the basis of a double rationale. On the one hand, safe harbours allow for exponentially increased market liquidity based on the highly efficient use of assets for purposes of collateralisation. Literally any type of asset, regardless of its legal nature, can now be turned into cash using repo or derivatives transactions. Differences between cash, claims and securities become irrelevant and the importance of the legal nature of rights in these assets (traditionally full title, security interest or claim) likewise vanishes. As a consequence, the concept of 'asset' assimilates with the concept of 'liquidity' as all positions held by a financial institution with its counterparty form part of the same gigantic current account-the grand total of which, the 'net amount', corresponds to the risk exposure. The amount of liquidity created through safe harbours, which mirrors the degree to which risk is shifted, depends on the scope of safe harbours (Which types of transaction? Which types of financial institution?)
as chosen by the relevant legislator.
On the other hand, insolvency safe harbours limit -or even well-nigh eliminateindividual counterparty credit risk for the sake of increased overall systemic stability.
However, the systemic risk aspect of the rationale is much more complex than is commonly understood and goes far beyond the idea that domino-like contagion is avoided from the outset because the counterparties of the insolvent party will not fail as a consequence of the safe harbour protection. Rather, that -valid -argument is both supported and countered by other mechanisms that either limit (eg, avoidance of runs on ailing firms) or increase (eg, moral hazard) the systemic risk. Which of these effects will prevail depends on the concrete circumstances and is difficult to predict. The systemic risk rationale is further weakened by the appearance of bank resolution regimes. These new administrative procedures render safe harbours largely irrelevant as tools to mitigate systemic risk.
Furthermore, the liquidity and the risk rationale are closely intertwined. The highly efficient use of homogenized assets on a cross-border, globalized basis makes collateral more readily available and at lower cost, but at the same time spreads the collateral cover very thinly across the market: it is large and flexible but can break easily if something goes wrong. So again, what is beneficial generally (collateral more easily available) may turn out to be dangerous in times of stress (no asset reserves).
The above leaves the legislator with a picture in which the containment of counterparty risk through safe harbours is clear, but where it is not so obvious whether the limitation of systemic risk is a good enough policy argument. This dilemma reflects the fact that in the financial market, risk can be dispersed but will not effectively disappear until obligations are settled. Yet legislators, in their normative decisions, opt for liquidity and strong growth of the financial market -an argument well-known in the world of traditional security interests, which generally privileges major market players for the sake of a more liquid lending market. To the extent that safe harbours are based on a systemic risk rationale, this is at odds with reality -the main argument, at least today, is liquidity. This incongruence explains why the debate on safe harbours is so relevant to the US but much less so in other jurisdictions. Where insolvency law is more creditorfriendly from the outset, liquidity of assets is a more attractive argument than it is in debtor-focused insolvency regimes.
Still, repealing or fundamentally revising the concept of safe harbours with a view to avoiding adverse systemic effects is not only unnecessary but also rather counterproductive. 126 First, systemic risk is based on an amalgam of many different causes and incentives and changing the safe harbour regime would only address one isolated aspect, whereas the overall repercussions for risk management flowing from changes to the safe harbour regime are potentially negative. Secondly, insolvency law, though it has significant influence on the behaviour of market participants towards risk-taking while they are going concerns is too bold a tool to control that behaviour. This role is better left to regulation. Regulation is able to address more selectively the vast majority of adverse systemic effects in which safe harbours may have a (smaller or larger) share, notably by establishing requirements for liquidity buffers, mandatory haircuts, initial margin requirements, central clearing and in respect of risk-taking behaviour, without choking the liquidity made possible by the safe harbours.
Furthermore, there is no equally effective risk mitigation tool to hand at the moment, especially not from a global point of view. Only safe harbours allow for cross- 126 The recent report of the American Bankruptcy Institute on a possible reform of Chapter 11 (n 14) has stopped short of recommending a fundamental overhaul of the safe harbour concept. See, in particular, ibid. 102 in relation to the riskaccelerating effect of safe harbours.
jurisdictional use of assets on the present scale, an effect that is achieved through homogenous insolvency regimes in this respect. This globalisation of asset use could never be achieved on the basis of traditional security, if only for reasons of lack of legal certainty.
In the future, safe harbours will continue to spread to other jurisdictions. Insolvency safe harbours have a logical attraction for every aspiring financial market. The fact that safe harbours are an integral part of the capital requirements regime and the considerably increased liquidity that comes with safe harbours would make it virtually impossible for a jurisdiction to participate in the global financial market if they did not have a safe harbour regime. Contracting with market players from markets that lack safe-harbour protection is expensive and much riskier. Therefore, markets and regulators will need to continue implementing safe harbours, many using the Financial Collateral Directive or the UNIDROIT Principles on Close-out Netting as blueprints. As long as fundamental ideas about the size of the financial market and the acceptance of the risk naturally flowing from it are not re-thought, there is no viable alternative to insolvency safe harbours.
